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India’s investment rate has increased fourfold since 1950 and is now nearly 40% of GDP. 
Many  studies  have  suggested  that  this  rising  investment  rate  is  the  most  significant 
component of India’s growth acceleration. I assess these hypotheses using the neoclassical 
growth model decomposition method. Unlike other methods based on this model, such as 
Hall and Jones (QJE 1999), the method used in this paper does not rely on the assumption of 
steady state. I find that the rise in investment rates since the 1970s explains only 30% of 
India’s growth over that period. I conclude that, notwithstanding the high investment rates, 
the main source of India’s growth acceleration is the modest upward trend in productivity 
growth since the 1970s.  
JEL: O1 
Keywords: Economic Growth, India, Growth Accounting, Investment, Productivity.
                                                              
* Economics, School of Business, University of Western Australia, Perth. Email: peter.robertson@uwa.edu.au    1 
1. Introduction 
India’s rapid economic growth, over the last two decades, is overshadowed by the Chinese 
economic miracle. Though somewhat slower, India’s growth has nevertheless been steady for 
several decades and is still very dramatic in a global context. Moreover, the fact that it has 
been achieved within the context of a stable democracy makes India’s growth experience a 
very important model for aspiring developing economies. 
Among  the  explanations  for  India’s  success  there  is  a  prominent  view  that  the  rising 
investment rate has been a key factor, for example , for example Athukorala and Sen (2002), 
Bardhan (2006), Basu and Maertens (2007). In particular the investment rate increased four-
fold since 1950, and has accelerated particularly quickly since 2000, rising from around 25% 
to nearly 40% of GDP.
1  
Yet the notion that differences in investment rates across time or countries can explain a large 
fraction of growth sits uncomfortably with the neoclassical growth model and is rejected on 
that basis by influential studies such as Hall and Jones (1999), Prescott (1998), Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Caselli (2005) and Hsieh and Klenow, (2010). They also expressed 
dissatisfaction with standard growth accounting analyses which fails to take account of the 
interaction  between productivity  growth and capital accumulation.  Hall  and Jones (1999) 
propose  an  alternative  methodology  which  relies  on  the  steady-state  behaviour  of  the 
neoclassical model. 
                                                              
1 The view that the rise in investment rates is a key factor in India’s growth is also widely held in the poplar 
policy debate literature Shome (2006), Mohan (2008), The Economist (2010). One voice of dissent, however, is 
Bosworth, et al (2007) who lament the lack of capital growth in India’s development. They point to India’s poor 
business climate indicators as a potential source of the “modest” capita growth. These conclusions are based 
largely on growth accounting studies which report, in the words of the authors, a modest contribution from 
capital. I have discussed these growth accounting results further in a companion paper, Robertson (2010).   2 
The usefulness of the Hall and Jones (1999) decomposition approach has been questioned by 
Caselli (2005).  Moreover,  the  usefulness  of  the  steady  state  conditions  is  likely  to  be 
inappropriate for studying transitional growth, as is being experienced by India. To this end 
this paper describes and applies an alternative method for decomposing the sources of growth 
in  India.  It  calculates  the  exact  contributions  of  changes  in  investment  and  productivity, 
according  to  the  neoclassical  models  allowing  for  both  transitional  growth  and  the 
endogeneity of capital accumulation.  
Section 2 of this paper reviews the Indian growth data and the debate over the role of reforms 
in India’s growth and presents the standard growth accounting results. Section 3 describes the 
Hall  and  Jones  approach  and  applies  it  to  India.  The  main  analysis  and  results  are  then 
presented in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.  
2.  Reforms and the Growth Acceleration 
2.1 The Reform Process   
The basic facts of India’s growth are well known. Figure 1 shows India’s GDP per capita, 
y L Y = / , since 1950. It also shows the smoothed series using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. 
The data is in logs and indexed to y = 1 in 1950. The rising growth rate can clearly be seen 
though the acceleration is gradual, beginning in the late 1970s or early 1980s. Figure 2 shows 
the same data graphed in terms of annual growth rates rather than levels. It can be seen that 
the growth rate of GDP per worker accelerates from around 1.5 - 2% per year prior to 1970, 
after which it accelerates steadily to just over 5% per year in 2007. 
Figure 3 shows gross investment as a fraction of GDP at current market prices from the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The graph indicates a fairly steady rise in the investment rate 
and also emphasises the acceleration over the last decade. There is also a slow growth period   3 
in 1967-1973, after which there is steady growth. A number of authors, including Athukorala 
and Sen (2004), Sen (2007), Virmani (2004) and Basu and Maertens (2007), have identified 
this change with the nationalization of banks and the rise of domestic savings, facilitated by 
policies that required these nationalised banks to extend their branches into rural areas. 
The relationship between these changes in the growth and investment rates and the economic 
reform  process  has  been  controversial,  and  is  dubbed  the  “great  growth  debate”  by 
Panagaryia (2008). De Long (2003) sparked the debate by pointing out that the apparent 
acceleration in growth rates preceded the reform era, which began in 1991, by several years. 
For example in Figure 2, the simple HP trend series indicates an acceleration well before 
1991, and possibly as early as 1970. Rodrik (2003) and Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) take 
this issue further arguing that because this acceleration precedes the extensive reforms of 
1990-91, the acceleration in growth was not related to any specific reforms. Rather, they 
argue, it arose as a consequence of a switch from a socialist political environment to a pro- 
business one.  It was, in their words, the cessation  of government  hostility  to the private 
sector, which sparked the growth process. 
Panagariya (2004, 2008) and Srinivasan (2005) view the Rodrik and Subramanian thesis as a 
mis-reading of the India’s policy regime, showing that, contrary to Rodrik and Subramanian’s 
assertion, there were significant reforms during the 1980s. Panagayria (2008) in particular 
details many pro-market reforms that had been enacted prior to 1991. These include a de-
licensing of a large fraction of the manufacturing sector, enhancing its ability to expand, and 
the removal, or softening, of investment regulations on large firms. There were also trade 
reforms,  including:  an  expansion  of  the  list  of  allowable  capital  and  intermediate  goods 
imports;  the  conversion  of  import  licences  to  tariffs,  and;  changes  to  export  licensing 
arrangements  including  the  formation  of  export  processing  zones.  Indeed,  because  of  its   4 
piecemeal  nature  and  focus  on  easy  targets,  Panagriaya  (2008)  denotes  this  an  era  of 
“liberalization by stealth”.  
Furthermore  Panagriaya  (2008)  notes  that  rising  government  spending  at  this  time  was 
fuelled  by  borrowing  rather  than  taxation,  which  he  argues  also  stimulated  short-run 
economic growth. With a closed economy and fixed exchange rates, however, the extent to 
which this fiscal expansion could be funded was limited by the inability to borrow externally.  
The major reforms are then marked by the New Industrial Policy of 1990-91, which removed 
investment licensing, import licensing, public sector monopolies, and introduced automatic 
approval for foreign direct investment (FDI). According to Panagriaya (2008) and Srinivasan 
(2005), these reforms had the effect of locking in the higher growth that had been archived 
through the combination of piecemeal reforms and fiscal deficits during the 1980s. 
Recently Sen (2007) has given more weight to the view that significant reforms predated the 
1991 reform programme, and were even occurring in the 1970s. He points to the rise in 
investment since the mid 1970s which was mainly due to the increase in corporate investment 
in machinery and equipment capital, which increased from below 2% of GDP in 1979 to 
above 6% by 1991. It then boomed temporarily to above 10% of GDP after the new Industrial 
policy was introduced. Sen (2007) argues that financial deepening was a key determinant of 
this  rise  in  private  equipment  investment  along  with  complementary  investment  in 
infrastructure.  
The link with financial deepening is important since Athukorala and Sen (2004), and Basu 
and Maertens (2007) have emphasised the importance of the expansion of bank branches 
following the nationalization of commercial banks in 1969, and the formation of the Unit 
Trust in 1964. Hence this evidence points to specific reforms in the 1960s and early 1970s 
that may have also had an impact of India’s growth. As noted by Sen (2007), there is also   5 
evidence of a rising growth rate during the 1970s, once allowance is made for the effects of 
the drought and second oil shock in 1979. As can be seen in Figure 1 the acceleration would 
appear quite smooth in the absence of the large negative shock in this year.  
Thus the emerging view is that reforms beginning as early as 1969 sparked the acceleration in 
the growth rate. These reforms continued in piecemeal fashion through the 1980s until the 
more radical new industrial deregulation in the early 1990s locked in higher growth rates by 
much  more  widespread  de-licensing,  removal  of  investment  barriers  and  external  sector 
reforms. 
2.2 Productivity Growth   
The reforms are generally believed to have raised growth rates through two channels. The 
first is the impact on investment through regulations affecting banking in the 1960-70s and 
the removal of direct regulations on investment. The subsequent impact on investment rates 
was  discussed  above.  The  second  channel  is  the  direct  effect  of  reforms  on  economic 
efficiency, and the adoption of best practice technologies through pro-competitive effects 
within  industries.
2  These  effects  are  difficult  to  quantify,  but  can  be  measured,  albeit 
imperfectly, by Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth.  
The most common method of calculating TFP is to assume that real output of the economy is 
described by a Cobb-Douglas production function. Letting  t Y  denote real output at time t we 
have 
α α − =
1
t t t t L K A Y , where  t K  is capital,  t L  is labour and   t A  is an index of productivity 
measured in units of output, including improvements in labour quality. The usual concept of 
capital is accumulated investment using the perpetual inventory method,  
                                                              
2 The effects on trade liberalization of the Auto industry is a notable example, where a modern auto industry has 
replaced a state monopoly under which 1950’s technology, in the form of a re-badged Morris Oxford, had 
persisted into the 1990s.   6 
  t t t t K I K K δ − + = +1   (1) 
Where  I  is investment spending and δ  is the depreciation rate. Letting y=Y/L denote labour 
per worker, k=K/L denote capital per worker and, output per worker terms is, 
 
α
t t t k A y =   (2) 
and TFP is calculated as 
α
t t t k y A / = , which is an index of productivity measured in units of 
output.  
The results of this standard growth accounting decomposition are shown in Table 1. The 
variables  reported are average  growth rates over the period indicated.
3  Column 1 reports 
average rates of output growth per capita for  India. Column 2 reports the rate of capital 
accumulation  and  the  “capital  contribution”  is  reported  in  Column  3.  The  “capital-
contribution is simply the assumed capital income share, multiplied by the growth rate of 
capital. The difference between Column 1 and Column 3 is the “Solow-Residual – the growth 
rate of conventionally measured productivity. The calculations all assume a capital income 
share of α = 1/3. 
For the whole period 1950-51 to 2007-08 it can be seen that the growth rate of capital is the 
same  as  the  growth  rate  of  output,  2.8%.  Because  of  this  the  growth  accounting 
decomposition simply assigns 1/3 of growth to capital accumulation and 2/3 to productivity, 
so  that  the  Solow  residual  is  simply  1.8%.  This  highlights  the  insipidness  of  growth 
accounting, at least in terms of relating the results to theory or policy implications. 
Nevertheless the impact of the acceleration in investment rates from the 1970’s can be seen in 
the  growth  accounting  data  also.  Relative  to  the  previous  two  decades,  from  the  1970s 
                                                              
3 The output and labour data are taken from the Reserve Bank of India (2010) and Bosworth et al (2007). The 
capital stock data is computed using the RBI gross fixed investment data and with an assumed rate of 
depreciation of 0.025   7 
onwards the average growth rate of productivity rises marginally but the rate of growth of 
capital  rises  from  1.1%  to  3.8%.  Over  this  period  productivity  growth  accounts  for  1.9 
percentage points of the 3.2 percentage point growth rate of GDP per worker, or 60% of the 
growth. Thus the relative contribution of capital in this case is 40%, up from 33% over the 
whole  period  and  just  19%  in  the  period  1950-1970.  Thus  standard  growth  accounting 
suggests that capital accumulation suggests that India’s higher growth since the 1970s is, at 
least partly, explained by higher rates of capital accumulation relative to earlier periods. This 
at  least  is  consistent  with  the  view  that  raising  investment  rates  have  been  important. 
Nevertheless it does not provide us with an answer to the question we wish to answer, which 
is, how much extra growth was generated by the rise in the investment rates over a specific 
fine time period?   
3. Neoclassical Models. 
Thus we have seen that, although the growth accounting results indicate how the growth rate 
of productivity has changed, they don’t tell us how much of the additional growth in this 
period was due to the increases in investment rates, or how much was due to productivity 
growth.  To  answer  these  questions  we  need  a  theory  of  how  capital  accumulation  and 
productivity growth are related.  
Standard growth models, such as the Solow-Swan model and the Ramsey models, show that 
policies  that  affect  the  investment  rate,  such  as  taxes,  subsidies  and  financial  sector 
regulation, will induces changes in income levels and transitional growth rates, but not long 
run  steady  state  growth  rates.  Specifically  in  the  Solow-Swan  model  there  is  a  simple 
relationship between income and investment,  
  t t Y s I = .  (3)   8 
The growth rate of the economy converges to a steady state growth rate where per capital 
income growth is equal to the growth rate of productivity in terms of effective labour units. 
Increases in the investment rate, s, and changes in the level of productivity, A, will both raise 
the steady state income level. In this model it is well known that the ratio of steady state per 
capita income levels from an initial investment rate s, to a new rate s′, is   
 
) 1 /( ) / ( /
α α − ′ = ′ s s y y   (4) 
For example if α = 1/3, the four-fold increase in the investment rate will produce a doubling 
of GDP per capita over a full transition. Thus the impact of a percentage  change in the 
investment rate has a much more muted impact in the percentage change in income levels.
 4  
However  changes  in  productivity  also  have  an  impact  on  income  levels.  An  increase  in 
productivity from A to A′ will raise GDP per worker by 
) 1 /( 1 ) / ( /
α − ′ = ′ A A y y . Thus a given 
percentage  increase  in  productivity  has  a  magnified  effect  on  per  capita  incomes.  For 
example,  with  α = 1/3,  a  doubling  of  productivity,  2 / = ′ A A ,  will  induce  a  three–fold 
increase in GDP per worker. This magnified effect arises because productivity growth also 
induces capital accumulation.  
This point is well known in the literature and was raised explicitly as a concern about growth 
accounting by Klenow et al (1997) and Hulten and Srinivasan (1999) among others. In their 
cross country accounting Hall and Jones (1999) suggest a modified version of this process 
which relies on the steady state equilibrium of the neoclassical growth model. Hall and Jones’ 
(1999)  approach  is  easiest  to  see  by  rewriting  the  production  function  with  productivity 
measured in effective labour units  
                                                              
4  The  investment  equation can  be  modified  to  include  barriers  to  investment  that  reduce the  efficiency  of 
converting a given amount of financial investment to physical capital. In this case an expression similar to (4) 
can be derived for the Ramsey model relating changes in barriers to investment to changes in income levels.    9 
 
α α − =
1 B k y   (5) 
where  ( ) α − ≡
1 / 1 A B , is productivity, but is now expressed in equivalent units of labour rather 
than  units  of  output.  Since  the  production  function  is  Cobb-Douglas  (2)  and  (5)  are 
equivalent, the only difference being the units in which productivity levels are measured. By 
dividing both sides of (5) by 
α y , the production function can be rearranged as  
  B y k y
) 1 /( ) / (
α α − =   (6) 
It is well known that in the neoclassical model, on a steady state k/y is constant and both y 
and k grow at the same rate as technology measured in labour units, B. Thus consider an 
economy that has moved from one steady-state to another as a result of both: (i) changes in 
the level of productivity, from  B to  B′, and; (ii) changes in the investment rate that changes 
k/y but not B. Hall and Jones (1999) use Equation (6) to decompose the changes in income 
into the productivity term,  B′/B, and the capital deepening term given by changes in the k/y 
ratio using variance decomposition. They do this by computing the k/y ratios across countries 
and then inferring the change in B.
5  
Table 2 reports the results of this alternative steady-state based decomposition applied to the 
Indian data.
6 Column 1 reports output per worker again for reference. Column 2 reports the 
average rate of growth in the capital-labour ratio. Column 3 then reports the growth rate of 
the capital output ratio weighted by  ) 1 /( α α − , as in (6). The residual is productivity growth 
measured in effective labour units, B, shown in Column 4.  
                                                              
5 Equivalently one could simply scale up the changes in TFP ratios calculated from standard growth accounting  
using the relationship  B B A A / ) / (
) 1 /( 1 ′ = ′ −α . 
6 Hall and Jones use a variance decomposition methodology to explain how variations in productivity and 
capital output ratios explain variations in per capita incomes. Here we simply make pairwise comparisons over 
points in time. As with the previous growth accounting results ratios are converted to annualised growth rates. 
Thus for example the growth rate of GDP per worker is calculated as  1 ) / (
/ 1 − ′ =
T
y y y g .   10
It can be seen that, according to the Hall and Jones (1999) decomposition, between 1950-
2007 productivity growth as measured by the growth rate of productivity in labour units B, 
explains all of India’s growth. Consequently changes in the capital to output ratio explain 
none of India’s growth!  
This aberrant conclusion is an immediate implication of the fact that that the capital to output 
ratio, on average, has been stationary. From (6) if k/y does not change, all growth must be due 
to changes in B. Given that there was a quadrupling of the rate of investment over the period 
of study, however, it is clearly unreasonable to attribute none of India’s growth to capital 
deepening!  
The clumsiness of this method is, therefore, primarily a consequence of the use of the steady 
state, and hence the implicit assumption that the growth rate of productivity is the same at the 
start and end dates. In particular, a rise in the growth rate of productivity, not just a change in 
the level, will cause the capital-output ratio to fall. Hence the rising productivity growth and 
rising  investment  rates  in  India have approximately offset  each other so that the capital-
output ratio has remained constant. But this does not mean, as is suggested by the Hall and 
Jones type decomposition, that productivity growth was the only source of growth. Growth 
rates clearly would have been lower if the investment rate had not risen as fast as it did.  
Thus, though Hall and Jones’s (1999) method may be suitable for some purposes, it should 
probably  not  be  taken  too  seriously  when  applied  to  periods  of  time  where  productivity 
growth rates are thought to have changed, or across countries where productivity growth rates 
may differ.
7  
                                                              
7 Caselli (2005) also expresses reservations about the Hall and Jones (1999) method, pointing out that it mixes 
up productivity and accumulation responses, since output depends on productivity growth. However one could 
counter that capital accumulation also depends on productivity growth. His solutio is to resort to the usual 
growth accounting method treating capital accumulation as independent of productivity.   11
4. Decomposing Growth with Simulation Methods 
4.1 Simulation  
More desirable is a decomposition method that makes use of the insights of the neoclassical 
model,  relating  productivity  growth  to  capital  accumulation,  but  without  imposing  the 
assumption of a steady state or constant growth rate of productivity. To do this is remarkably 
simple  using  a  simulation  method.  We  begin  with  the  standard  growth  accounting  data, 
including capital stocks calculated using the perpetual inventory method, given by (1). This 
gives  us  the  standard  growth  accounting  data  as  discussed  above:  investment  flows,  t I , 
labour flows  t L , capital stocks,  t K , real output flows,  t Y , and also an assumed production 
function as in (2), with given values of the factor shares, α. Standard growth accounting 
recovers the values of  t A .   
To this I add the neoclassical relationship between factor accumulation and incomes as in (3), 
allowing for the fact that in practice the investment rate, s, varies over time,  t t t Y s I = . The 
actual values of  t s  can then be recovered from gross investment and GDP data as  t t t Y I s / = .  
Thus we have a series of values for  t K ,  t Y ,  t A ,  t s  and  t L , which is the data required to 
calibrate the Solow-Swan growth model. It is a three equation recursive dynamic system (1), 
(2) and (3). Consistent with that model we treat  t K ,  t Y , as endogenous variables and  t A ,  t s  
and  t L  as exogenous variables. Observations on initial values of  t K ,  t Y ,  t A ,  t s  and  t L , 
determine  1 + t K  using equation (1) . Given the production function, the exogenous values of 
1 + t A   and  1 + t L   determine  1 + t Y .  In  this  way,  the  actual  data  can  be  reconstructed  exactly.   12
Moreover, every change in income can be decomposed exactly into a change in inputs, the 
investment rate or a change in productivity.
8 
For any experiment we continue to treat  t A ,  t s  and  t L  as exogenous variables and  t K ,  t Y , as 
endogenous  variables.  The  effects  of  productivity  on  growth  can  be  determined  by 
considering an alternative series for productivity growth, which we denote  t A′. Likewise we 
can calculate the impact on  t K , and  t Y , of a counterfactual series for the investment rate,  t s′, 
holding  t A  and  t L  constant. In this way we can decompose the influences of these alternative 
factors on growth, allowing for endogenous capital accumulation responses over transitions. 
No steady state assumptions are necessary. 
4.2 Results 
Following Sen (2007) we take 1970 as the date where India’s current acceleration begins. We 
therefore  assess  the  role  of  the  effect  of  the  acceleration  in  investment  rates  on  India’s 
growth, and the effect of the acceleration in productivity growth, since 1970-71.  To quantify 
the impact of the rise in investment rates we consider the comparative static experiment: what 
would growth have been had the investment rate remained constant at its 1970 level of 15%?   
Choosing a counterfactual for productivity growth is not quite as straightforward as there is 
substantial  variation  in  the  productivity  series.  As  shown  in  Figure  4,  the  trend  rate  of 
conventionally measured Solow-Residual fell from 1950 to the 1970s, when it reached a 
minimum of just under 0.8 percent. Since then the trend has accelerated. In what follows I 
quantify  the  role  of  this  productivity  growth  acceleration  from  1970.  Thus,  in  the 
                                                              
8 Changes in depreciation rates could also be accommodated using official capital consumption data. In the 
interest of simplicity I abstract from this factor.  A similar method is was also employed to look at the East 
Asian Miracle, by Robertson (2000)    13
counterfactual  base  we  hold  productivity  growth  rate  fixed  at  its  1970  level  of  0.8%, 
008 . 1 / 1 = + t t A A . 
The results of these experiments, along with the actual path of GDP per capita since 1969-70, 
are shown in Figure 5. The path denoted Simulation 1, (S1) is a counterfactual path generated 
by holding both the investment rate at 15%, and the productivity growth rate at 0.8%. The 
path denoted S2 is the path generated by allowing the investment rate to rise according to the 
actual  data,  but  holding  the  productivity  growth  rate  at  0.8  per  cent  per  year.  In  S3 
productivity growth rates take on their actual values, and the investment rate is held constant 
at 15%.   
Comparing the ratio of GDP per capita in S2 relative to GDP per capita in S1 then gives the 
impact of the rise in investment rates on GDP per capita. Likewise comparing the ratio of 
GDP per capita in S3  relative to S1  gives the impact of the acceleration in productivity 
growth.  By  design  when  both  of  these  are  combined  together  we  arrive  at  exactly  the 
historical growth path shown. In this way we can obtain a sensible decomposition of the 
contribution of these two factors to India’s growth acceleration.  
The graph shows the substantial difference of the impact of these two sources of growth. The 
average growth rate in S2 is approximately half a percentage point per year higher that the 
reference growth path S1. However the path generated by the  rising productivity growth 
rates, S3, is more than double this, at 1.2 percentage points higher.  
Further details of these calculations are given in Table 2. Column 1 gives the ratio of GDP 
per  worker  in  2007-08  to  actual  1970-71  GDP  per  worker.  Thus  there  was  a  three-fold 
increase over this period. Under S1 there is only a 1.6 fold increase in GDP per capita, while 
under S2 and S3 the increase are approximately 1.97 fold and 2.56 fold respectively. Column 
2 reports the implied average growth rates over the 37 year period. Column 3 then reports the   14
difference in these average growth rates relative to S1. Thus it shows that S2, the rising 
investment rate, increases growth rates by half a percent per year. In contrast the productivity 
growth experiment (S3) adds approximately 1.4% points of GDP per capita growth. Finally 
Column 4 then reports these growth rates as a fraction of the actual growth gap between the 
actual experience and the base simulation in S1, which gives the results reported above. 
Thus, despite the dramatic rise in investment rates, this explains only 30% of the differences 
in growth rates between S1 and the actual growth in the standard neoclassical growth model. 
In contrast the rise in productivity growth since 1970 explains 68% of the growth. The 2% 
remainder is due to interaction between these two components.  
It  is  evident  that  the  productivity  acceleration  has  been  much  more  important  than  the 
acceleration  in  investment  rates.  This  is  perhaps  surprising  since  the  acceleration  in 
investment rates has been much more dramatic, and certainly received considerable attention 
in the literature. The results of course reflect the mechanics of the neoclassical model, where, 
within the empirically valid range of capital income shares, the diminishing returns to capital 
reduces the impact of accumulation on income levels. 
4.3 Discussion 
It  is  interesting  then  to  compare  these  results  with  the  two  growth  accounting  methods 
reported above. For the post 1970 period the standard growth accounting method attributed 
1.26 percentage points of growth (1/3 of 3.8 percentage points) to capital accumulation and 
1.9 percentage points to productivity. The division was thus approximately 60% productivity 
and 40% factor accumulation. On the other hand the Hall and Jones’ (1999) method attributes 
practically all the growth (99%) to productivity and only 1% to accumulation.  
The  results  derived  using  the  simulation  model  take  account  of  the  endogeneity  of 
investment, as is the aim of the Hall and Jones (1999) method, but give very different results.   15
Specifically  the  Hall  and  Jones  (1999)  method  dramatically  overstates  the  impact  of 
productivity  in  this  case,  because,  in  India,  it  does  not  account  for  the  impact  of  an 
acceleration in productivity growth on reducing the capital-output ratio. 
Moreover these simulations answer specific questions about the partial dynamic impacts of 
observed changes in the investment rate and productivity growth rates. In contrast, standard 
growth accounting methods fall short of informing us on these types of questions. 
4.4 Sensitivity 
A potential important consideration is the economic impact of changes in the income shares 
of capital and labour. As the capital income share, α, increases, changes in the investment 
rate  will  have  larger  impact  on  GDP.  In  the  limit,  as  α  approaches  unity  the  model 
approaches an “AK model, and increases in investment rates will have permanent effects on 
the growth rate.  
Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix show that for moderate changes in the capital income 
share, there are also important effects. With α=0.4, the impact of the investment rate increase 
is substantially larger, though still smaller than the impact of productivity growth, with the 
division approximately 41% investment and 57% productivity. With α=0.3, however we have 
25% due to investment and 73% due to productivity. Thus to reverse the conclusion that the 
investment rate increases have been a secondary source of growth we would need to assume a 
capital income share substantially greater than 0.4. This of course reflects the basic properties 
of the neoclassical growth model (see for example Caselli 2005).
9 
                                                              
9 A second potential consideration is the elasticity of substitution, which is equal to unity in a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. Simulations with a CES production function, however, show very little change in the 
results across a wide range of potential values for the elasticity of substitution.   16
4.4 India’s Latest Investment Boom 
One feature of the rise in investment rates since the 1970s is that it has been fairly gradual, 
though steady until the new millennium. As can be seen from Figure 3, India’s investment 
rate  rise  has  been  much  more  spectacular  since  2000-01,  rising  from  25  to  37%. 
Commentators such as Basu and Maertens (2007), Mohan (2008), and Basu (2008) have cited 
this boom as a likely important source of India’s strong growth in the new Millennium. As 
we have seen however, productivity growth has also been strong particularly since 2003. 
Suppose then we consider a counterfactual growth path where the investment rate from 2000 
onwards is held constant at the 2000 level of 25% of GDP, rather than accelerating up to 37% 
of GDP. Figure 5 shows the resulting growth path. It can be seen that holding investment 
fixed at 25% has very little impact on the path of per capita incomes. Over this period actual 
incomes increased by a factor of 1.42 and under the counterfactual it increases by a factor of 
1.35. This means that the contribution of investment has been to raise incomes by a factor of 
1.42/1.32=1.05. Converting these ratios to growth rates, over the eight year period, gives a 
growth rate in the counterfactual of 3.8% per annum, relative to the actual growth rates of 
4.5% per annum. Thus the dramatic increase in investment only accounts for an additional 
0.7 percentage points of growth. Thus the contribution of investment over this sub period is 
almost the same as the contribution over the whole period 1970-2007. 
10 
Note however that if the investment rate remains at this higher level into the future, then the 
longer run accumulation effects will be more substantial. Using (2), the ratio of incomes from 
the increase in investment rates from 25% to 37% is approximately a 
2 / 1 ) 25 / 37 (  = 1.22 fold 
increase in incomes. Clearly then, this factor will only be a minor determinant of India’s 
                                                              
10 With α=0.4 the contribution of investment acceleration from 25-27% rises to 7.7 percentage points, and for 
α=0.3 it falls to 0.65 percentage pints.    17
growth in the near future, if the current rate of productivity growth, of around 4-5% per year 
is also sustained. 
5. Conclusion 
The central question of this paper has been to identify the main sources of India’s growth 
acceleration since the 1970s. But without a clear model of the  relationships between the 
growth  data,  it  is  difficult  to  glean  any  meaning  or  policy  insights.
11  Fortunately  the 
neoclassical  growth  model  gives  us  a  potential  “Rosetta  Stone”  with  which  to  decipher 
India’s growth data. Standard growth accounting methods, however, do not fully incorporate 
the interdependence between productivity and economic growth which is the hallmark of that 
model. Hence, as pointed out by Hall and Jones (1999) among others, growth accounting 
overstates  the  contribution  of  capital  to  growth  and  understates  the  contribution  of 
productivity. 
This  paper  describes  a  technique  use  the  neoclassical  growth  model  to  quantify  the 
interaction  between  productivity  growth  and  capital  accumulation,  allowing  for  the 
transitional dynamics. This allows us to derive quantitative measures of the impact of the rise 
in India’s investment rates, thus clarifying a key point of contention in India’s “great growth 
debate.”   
Because  the  method  here  allows  for  the  effect  of  productivity  growth  on  capital 
accumulation, the results give more emphasis to the benefits of higher productivity growth 
than traditional growth accounting does. Thus the additional growth from the acceleration in 
productivity growth is shown to be greater than just its direct impact, due to its impact of 
capital accumulation. 
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Nevertheless  the  results  are  much  more  sensible  than  the  Hall  and  Jones  (1999) 
decomposition which attributes practically none of India’s growth to investment, despite a 
quadrupling  of  the  investment  rate.  Thus  I  find  that  investment  has  indeed  played  an 
important,  but  secondary,  role  in  India’s  growth  acceleration.  The  actual  increase  in 
productivity  growth  accounts  for  68%  of  India’s  post  1970s  growth  and  the  rise  in  the 
investment rate accounts for 30%. Thus the upward productivity growth trend has been more 
than twice as important as the doubling of the investment rate.
12  
A similar conclusion applies for the post 2000 era, where a dramatic rise in investment from 
25% to 37% of GDP, only adds about 0.7 percentage points of growth to the 4.5% annual 
growth rate over this period.  
The emphasis on productivity growth for India’s success underscores the key role of the 
reform  process.  Indeed  many  economic  reforms  will  affect  both  investment  rates  and 
productivity growth, such as the de-licensing of domestic and foreign investment, removal of 
restrictions on firm size, increasing openness, and de-licensing of FDI restrictions. These 
policies facilitate investment but also potentially facilitate investment in new capital goods. 
In contrast, mandated savings polices and investment based tax concessions – which both 
effectively  reduce  the  return  to  capital  -  may  well  have  the  effect  of  stimulating  capital 
deepening without inducing productivity growth.  
                                                              
12 Alternatively it might be argued that the increase in the investment rate is of primary importance due to its 
potential impact on productivity – i.e. endogenous growth effects which go beyond the simple neoclassical 
model used here. For example Athukorala and Sen (2002) find, using a very different model, that reforms 
factors, such as increased openness in India, increased the impact of investment on growth rates.   19
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Table 1: Growth Accounting Results (α α α α=1/3) 
  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi) 








1950-2007  4.8  2.0  2.8  2.8  0.9  1.8 
1950-1970  3.8  1.7  2.0  1.1  0.4  1.7 
1970-2007  5.3  2.1  3.2  3.8  1.3  1.9 
2000-2007  7.6  2.7  4.8  4.9  1.6  3.2 
 
Notes: All numbers are average annualised growth rates, calculated as averages using a discrete time formula. In 
a continuous time approximation, column (vi) equals column (iii) minus column (v). Column (v) equals column 
(iv) multiplied by 1/3.   23
 
 
Table 2: Steady State Decomposition based on Hall and Jones (α α α α=1/3) 
  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 







) 1 /( /




1950-2007  2.8  0.06  0.03  2.7 
1950-1970  2.0  -0.91  -0.46  2.5 
1970-2007  3.2  0.59  0.29  2.9 
2000-2007  4.8  0.03  0.01  4.8 
 
Notes: By the standard growth accounting equation, column (ii) equals column (i) minus one third of the value 
in column (ii). The values of productivity growth in effective labour units, column (v) equal the difference 
between column (i) and column (iv). As discussed in the text they also equal the values productivity growth in 
output units, (iii), multiplied by 3/2.  
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Const Productivity and Investment (S1)  1.60  1.28  0.0  0.0 
Actual Investment Growth  &Const. Productivity) (S2)  1.97  1.86  0.57  30.2 
Actual Productivity Growth & Const. Investment (S3)  2.56  2.57  1.29  68.2 
Actual Growth 1970-01-2006-07  3.18  3.18  1.89  100.0 





















Const Productivity and Investment (S1)  1.70  1.44     
Actual Investment Growth  &Const. Productivity) (S2)  2.19  2.14  0.70  40.5 
Actual Productivity Growth & Const. Investment (S3)  2.42  2.42  0.99  56.7 
Actual Growth 1970-01-2006-07  3.18  3.18  1.74  100.0 
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Const Productivity and Investment (S1)  1.58  1.24     
Actual Investment Growth  &Const. Productivity) (S2)  1.88  1.72  0.48  25.0 
Actual Productivity Growth & Const. Investment (S3)  2.63  2.64  1.40  72.6 
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Appendix for the Referee 
The text makes use of the neoclassical growth model. Though this model is well known, for 
completeness this appendix derives the expressions used in the paper.  
Suppose we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function where per capita output, y, is given 
as a function of per capita capital stock, k, 
 
α α − =
1 B k y .  (A1) 
It is well known that the steady state equilibrium condition for the Solow-Swan model, in 





y ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( δ − − + +
=    (A2) 
where  1+n  is  the  annual  increase  in  labour  inputs,  1+g  denotes  the  annual  increase  in 
productivity, B, δ denotes the depreciation rate on capital and s is the investment rate.  
The model assumes s, n, g, δ are constant, at least for the purpose of pinning down a steady 
state. 
To find the steady state value of per capita income, y, both sides of (A1) are divided by 
α y , 
which gives  
  ( ) B y k y
) 1 /( /
α α − = .  (A3) 
The equilibrium value of income per capita is obtained by substituting (A2) into (A3), which 
gives  
  ( ) B s y
) 1 /( * /
α α χ
− =    (A4) 
where  ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( δ χ − − + + = g n . From this we obtain the basic equilibrium result for the 
model. Since s and c are constant, per capita income y grows at the same rate as productivity, 
B , which is given by 1+g.  
Hence an economy that moves from an initial steady state to a new steady state due to a 
change in the investment rate from s to s′ , will have an increase in per capita income of  




′ = ′ s s y y    (A5)   34
Likewise an economy that experiences a productivity change from B to  B′ , but no change in 
any other variable will experience a proportional increase in per capita income growth, 
  B B y y / / ′ = ′    (A6)   35
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